

SC No. 10383/67
30 October 1967

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of BLACK SHIELD
Photography of 28 October

Summary

This preliminary assessment of a BLACK SHIELD mission flown over North Vietnam on 28 October is based on only a partial field readout of the photography. The mission made two passes over North Vietnam north of the panhandle. Two-thirds of the area photographed--which included Hanoi, Haiphong, and the China border area--was cloud-free. All six of the major airfields of North Vietnam were covered. Recently struck Phuc Yen Airfield was shown to be serviceable again for at least limited fighter operations. With the exception of one bomb crater in the area, no bomb damage was noted at the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant. The Canal des Rapides Railroad and Highway Bridge and the alternate rail bypass bridge were shown to be interdicted. No indication of surface-to-surface missile deployment has been noted so far in the field readout.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence.

1. This preliminary assessment of BLACK SHIELD Mission 6732--flown over North Vietnam on 28 October--is based on only a partial field readout of the photography. The mission made two passes over North Vietnam north of the panhandle. Two-thirds of the area photographed--which included Hanoi, Haiphong, and the China border area--was cloud-free. No indication of surface-to-surface missile deployment has been noted so far in the field readout.

2. Airfields: All six of the major airfields of North Vietnam were photographed. All of them appeared to be serviceable.

3. At Phuc Yen Airfield, the bomb craters on the runway have been filled in and the airfield appeared to be capable of supporting at least limited fighter operations again. Unrepaired damage from the heavy US air attacks of 24 and 25 October included: bomb craters on the two main parking aprons and the parallel taxiway, two damaged MIG-21s, seven damaged aircraft revetments, and at least 15 aircraft revetments containing possible debris.

4. At Haiphong/Kien An Airfield, craters on the runway have been repaired, making it serviceable. Bomb craters were noted on the half-loop taxiway, in six parking revetments, and adjacent to the parallel taxiway.

5. At Hoa Lac Airfield, all bomb craters on the runway have been repaired and the runway appeared to be serviceable. Two damaged MIG-17s were observed.

6. Air Order of Battle: The mission may have photographed all of the MIG fighters left in North Vietnam at the time--with the exception of one MIG-21 believed to have been at Haiphong/Kien An Airfield. Three MIG-15/17s and two damaged MIG-21s were observed at Phuc Yen Airfield, two MIG-15/17s at Hanoi/Gia Lam Airfield, and two damaged MIG-17s at Hoa Lac Airfield.

25X1D

7. This readout may mean that there were only six operational fighters--five MIG-15/17s--and one MIG-21--in North Vietnam early on 28 October.

25X1D

25X1D



8. Transportation: Both the Canal des Rapides Railroad and Highway Bridge and the alternate rail bypass bridge were shown to be interdicted. Photography of the Canal des Rapides bridge shows one span destroyed, an adjoining span dropped, and a third span damaged. The Lang Son Railroad Bridge was also shown to be out of operation with three of its five spans dropped or destroyed.

9. A high level of activity was observed at both the Pinghsiang Railroad Yard--filled to about 60 percent of its capacity--and the Dong Dang Railroad Yard--filled to 70 percent of its capacity. Among the items noted in the Pinghsiang Complex area which may prove to be of more-than-routine interest were: (1) "34 flatcars with canvas-covered vehicles or pieces of equipment," (2) "16 long-stepped special equipment flatcars, of which three were loaded," and (3) "two long, canvas-covered vehicles or pieces of equipment."

10. Thermal Power Plants: At the Hanoi Thermal Power Plant, one bomb crater was visible adjacent to the shop area. No other bomb damage was noted. No smoke was observed, however, from any of the boiler-house stacks.

11. The Haiphong Thermal Power Plant East was not operational. The boilerhouse, generator hall and POL storage area have been destroyed. All buildings in the support area appeared heavily damaged or destroyed. The probable auxiliary generator hall, however, appeared undamaged.

12. The Haiphong Thermal Power Plant West was not operational. The boilerhouse, generator hall and water coolers were severely damaged, and debris was scattered throughout the area.

13. Photography of the Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant showed that efforts to repair damage were continuing. Roofing repairs on the generator hall have been completed, and roofing repairs on the boilerhouse were about 90 percent finished. Damage was shown to be particularly heavy in the high-voltage circuit breaker area--about 50 percent destroyed--and

in the transformer yard--one high-voltage transformer destroyed and two moderately damaged.

14. At the Hon Gai Thermal Power Plant, the transformer yard was heavily damaged. There were bomb craters around the power plant and possible light damage to the boilerhouse and generator hall. No smoke was coming from the stacks of the plant.

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BLACK SHIELD ASSESSMENT

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